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NOT READING MEANS LOSING: THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COST OF IGNORING OSAMA BIN LADEN'S
WORDS
Michael Scheuert
When asked to write an essay for the Journal of the National
Security Forum, it seemed appropriate to look at Osama bin Laden
and the far-from-fully-recognized threat he posed to the United
States by doing what a lawyer does in preparing a case: read all the
materials related to it. A lawyer, after all, presumably would not
enter a courtroom to argue a case without such thorough
preparation. And yet, I would argue the United States has been
waging a war against Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and its allies
without bothering to study his words in an effort to absorb what the
U.S. military calls the commander's intent.
As a result, come August 27, 2011, Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda,
and their allies will have been waging war on the United States for
fifteen years, and they will still be a basically unknown quantity to
U.S. policymakers, generals, intelligence officers, and even socalled al Qaeda experts. That this is the case is purely the result of
sloth or negligence, because since formally declaring war-on
August 27, 1996'-bin Laden has, at least in one way, followed the
model of America's victorious North Vietnamese enemies, Ho Chi
Minh and General Giap. Like our North Vietnamese vanquishers,
bin Laden has made sure the U.S. Government and its people have
no credible excuse for failing to understand what motivates the war
being waged against them by al Qaeda and other Islamists.
Through numerous statements, speeches, and interviews, bin
Laden has explicitly explained the Islamists' grievances, religious
motivation, war aims, metrics for measuring progress, and terms for
ending the war. Bin Laden's words have been plentiful and are

t I explore this issue more fully in MICHAEL SCHEUER, OSAMA BIN LADEN
(2011).
1. Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places, PBS NEWsHOUR, Aug. 27, 1996, available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.
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increasingly accessible in English. My own archive, for example,
contains over 175 primary-source documents, numbering more
than 800 pages. This is a significant amount of material, and yet
the only reasonable claim to make about my archive is that I hold
only the primary documents I found, not all that exist.
Given this body of primary-source documents, it is odd that so
few of them have been exploited by the Western political leaders,
writers, and analysts who have spoken on the issue or produced
books meant to explain who bin Laden was and what he was up to.
To date, works on bin Laden-with a few notable exceptions,
especially Peter Bergen's splendid and indispensable, The Osama
bin Laden I Know-have been based, in the main, on what others
have said about him, not what he himself has said.
These "others" come in two batches. The first tends to be such
enemies of bin Laden and al Qaeda as former Saudi intelligence
chief Prince Turki al-Faisal; the long- and still-imprisoned but nowreformed Egyptian Takfiri2 scholar Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr.
Fadl); and the former Islamist firebrand but now al-Saud
apologist/scholar, Shaykh Salman al-Awdah. The second batch is
found among former or current mujahedin who have fallen out
with bin Laden, men such as Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadi Setmariam
Nasar (a.k.a. Abu Musab al-Suri and Umar Abd al-Hakim);
Boudejema Bounoua (a.k.a. Abdullah Anas); Hashim al-Makki
(a.k.a. Abu Walid al-Masri and Mustafa Hamid); and Nasser alBahri (a.k.a. Abu Jandal). It is worth noting that the men in this
latter group broke with bin Laden over strategy, tactics, timing,
targeting, or concern for the Taleban regime's survival, but did not
become his enemies.
They still view him as an important,
Islamist leader. They differ with
inspirational
accomplished, and
bin Laden over tactics and targets but their ultimate goals for the
jihad are comparable to bin Laden's.
While what bin Laden's enemies and former close associates
have said about him is a major resource when analyzing his
thought, talents, weaknesses, intellect, successes, and failures, it is
not a sufficient base of data on which to develop a well-rounded
2. Takfirism is "the pronouncement of unbelief" against another Muslim
individual, group, or state. Once this judgment is made, the property and life of
the designated unbeliever can be taken. See Ibrahim A. Karawan, Takfir, OXFORD
In the Muslim
IsLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.
world, Takfiris are universally hated for their murderous behavior, and even more
so for their arrogance in usurping God's authority by making his judgment of who
is and is not a good Muslim.
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assessment of the man. It is, quite simply, less than half of the
story. To accomplish the task of accurate understanding, what
others say must be assessed alongside the primary-source bin Laden
documents. And yet, Western politicians, generals, policymakers,
and writers have largely failed to do so, often referring to the
primary bin Laden documents as rants, diatribes, and ravings, as if
they really emanated from the imaginary madman so often
described by U.S. Presidents, British and other European prime
ministers, and Arab tyrants. It must be said that leading Muslim
writers and journalists-especially Rahimullah Yusufzai, Abdel Bari
Atwan, and Ahmad Zaydan-have paid much closer attention to
bin Laden's words and use of Islamic history and, by and large,
have produced more sophisticated and accurate portraits of him.
Since 9/11, then, a score or more books have been written by
Western and Muslim authors about bin Laden and al Qaeda. In
regard to bin Laden, these books have focused on his character,
intelligence, leadership talent, public-speaking ability, skill at
exploiting Islam and its history in his rhetoric, international
influence, organizational skills, and modern management style. I
believe the best of these books are by Peter Bergen, Abdel Bari
Atwan, Steve Coll, and Brynjar Lia.
Among the rest, I have listed below books by Western and nonMuslim authors that have come to be categorized as essential works
on bin Laden and al Qaeda. In each case, the author and title are
followed by the number of citations of bin Laden's worksspeeches, interviews, statements, and so on-contained in that
author's endnotes. I have also noted where a large number of
3.

PETER L. BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNow: AN ORAL HISTORY OF AL
LEADER (2006); ABDEL BARI ATwAN, THE SECRET HISTORY OF AL QAEDA
(2006); STEVE COLL, THE BIN LADENS: AN ARABIAN FAMILY IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY
(2008); BRYNJAR LIA, ARCHITECT OF GLOBALJIHAD: THE LIFE OF AL-QAIDA STRATEGIST
ABU Mus'AB AL-SuI (2008).

QAEDA'S

4. Since 1996, no senior U.S. political leader or civil servant-save for Rep.
Ron Paul (R-TX)-has tried to explain to Americans what bin Laden has said,
what motivates him and those he inspires, or what they intend to accomplish.
Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama have educated Americans about
bin Laden with scare words like thug, gangster, un-Islamic, and monster. They
and their senior civil servants-like Obama terrorism czar John Brennan-have
lied to Americans about the religious-motivated war bin Laden and his allies are
waging against the United States. Indeed, Brennan lied directly to all Americans
when he said the word jihad means self improvement and has nothing to do with
martial activity. Either from ignorance or a desire not to anger the administration,
no journalist cited this blatant bit of dishonesty; almost all mentions ofjihad in the
Qur-an and Sunnah are martial in nature. SeeJohn 0. Brennan, Assistant to the
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citations pertain to relatively few primary documents. I did not, of
course, have access to electronic versions of these books. My count
is derived from a line-by-line reading of each book's notes, keeping
score as I went. I do not claim the counts are exact, but they are
quite close to the mark, and give a clear idea of the degree to which
each author exploited primary sources. The books are listed by
date of publication and, naturally, the more recent the publication
date the greater the number of primary documents were available
to the author. Except as noted above, I make no judgment
regarding the quality of each; some are fine works, others are listed

because so little quality work is available on bin Laden.
ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK
OF TERROR (2002)-20 citations to 8 documents
JASON BURKE, AL QAEDA: CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR
(2004)-5 citations
JONATHAN RANDAL, OSAMA: THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST
(2004)-2 citations
MARC

SAGEMAN,

UNDERSTANDING

TERROR NETWORKS

(2004)-2 citations
STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET

INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 (2004)-2 citations
FAWAz A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT
GLOBAL(2d ed. 2009) (2006)-15 citations to 5
documents
MARY HABECK, KNOWING THE ENEMY: JIHADIST IDEOLOGY
AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006)-52 citations to 14
documents

President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, Securing the Homeland by
Renewing America's Strengths, Resilience, and Values (May 26, 2010), available at
http://csis.org/files/attachments/100526_csis-brennan.pdf).
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LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL QAEDA AND
THE ROAD TO 9/11 (2006)-28 citations, 22 of which refer

to 4 documents
STEVE COLL, THE BIN LADENS: AN ARABIAN FAMILY IN THE
AMERICAN CENTURY (2008)-17 citations to 10 documents
SEARCH FOR AL QAEDA: ITS
LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND FUTURE (2008)-12 citations
BRUCE

RIEDEL,

THE

ROY GUTMAN, How WE MISSED THE STORY: OSAMA BIN
LADEN,

THE

TALIBAN,

AND

THE

HIJACKING

OF

AFGHANISTAN (2008)-11 citations
This list shows that despite the large body of primary-source
documents at hand, few of them have been exploited by Western
writers and analysts who have produced books meant to explain bin
Laden and what he is up to. The reason for this failure is not
entirely clear, but it seems to pivot off the reluctance of some
authors and most politicians to accept that in the early twenty-first
century, the Islamic religion can possibly be the driving force
behind bin Laden, al Qaeda, and their allies. They seem even
more reluctant to face-or at least publicly state-the fact that in
the eyes of most Muslims, Western policies and actions in the
Islamic world are not benign and humanitarian, but anti-Muslim
and lethal.
The bulk of bin Laden scholarship is extraordinarily
presentist. When Western authors encounter thinking or mores
they consider anachronisms in the modern world, they default to
asserting that ideas running counter to the tenets of secularism,
diversity, multiculturalism, and globalization are held by only
limited numbers of medieval, violence-prone, pseudo-Islamic thugs.
The predominantly secular authors, for example, hate the absence
of Western-style women's rights in much of the Muslim world, and
They detest the
so Islamists are always archmisogynists.
motivational power of the Islamic faith across the Muslim world,
which instructs that violence can be needed to defend faith, and so
the Islamists are described as distorters of their religion. Most of
all, they fear any threat to progress toward a secular world, and
so-notwithstanding much heart-on-sleeve prose-they prefer to
combat the Islamists with status quo policies featuring the West's
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defense of Arab tyrannies, efforts to impose secular democracy on
Muslims to negate Islam's overwhelmingly martial doctrine of
jihad, and claims that proliferating Islamist violence is due to such
bizarre, clearly wrong factors as nihilism, a lack of gender mixing,
illiteracy, and the hijacking of the Qur-an. A close reading of bin
Laden's words would offend the presentists' optimistic view of a
secular world triumphing over superstitious religion, and so they
have ignored the appeal of these words to tens, even hundreds of
millions of Muslims, much to the detriment of Western security,
economic vitality, and prospects for peace.
Because many of the essential bin Laden-related books lack a
thorough assessment of primary bin Laden sources, it is worth
looking at a few of the pieces of "common wisdom"-marked below
in italics-that have emanated from these books; conclusions that a
comprehensive assessment of primary sources would call into
question.
The Central Importance of Sayyed Qutb: The theorist ofjihad
as Hobbes's war of all against all, Qutb is seen in the West
as a principal shaper of bin Laden's thought and actions. 5
But in the corpus of bin Laden's work there is not a single
quotation from Qutb's work, nor does bin Laden ever
mention his name. That bin Laden accepts some of what
Qutb said is clear. As long as Qutb does not stray from
the Salfist-jihadi view of the Qur-an and the Sunnah (the
sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), bin
Laden concurs with him. But this is really no more than
saying the Qur-an and Sunnah are central to the thought
of bin Laden and most Muslims. When Qutb diverges
from these sources, bin Laden clearly has no use for his
recommendations and does not deign to even refer to
him. The idea that a direct line can be drawn from
Qutb's rather odd interpretation of Islam and bin Laden's
6
By
traditional Salafism simply cannot be substantiated.
5. See, e.g., Robert Siegel, Sayyid Qutb's America: Al Qaeda InspirationDenounced
U.S. Greed, Sexuality, NPR, May 6, 2003, http://www.npr.org/templates
/story/story.php?storyld=1 253796&from=mobile.
6. Two leading Western scholars of Salifi-jihadists, Quintan Wiktorowicz and
Joas Wagemakers, define those men as Salafists who do not believe that quiet
advice or public agitation against Muslim rulers, with the goal of persuading them
to govern strictly in accord with the Qur-an and the Sunnah, will succeed. Rather,
they believe that to purify Islam and bring Muslims back under God's rule, a
defensive jihad must be waged on Islam's foes. In essence, they seek to make jihad

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/27

6

Scheuer: Not Reading Means Losing: The National Security Cost of Ignoring

5326

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:5

studying and analyzing Qutb, we learn much about the
militant milieu in which bin Laden's generation was
reared but almost nothing about the mature bin Laden's
thought and motivation.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the 1 minence Grise: Western politicians
and writers often refer to al-Zawahiri-former Egyptian
Islamic jihad chief and now al Qaeda's deputy leader-as
bin Laden's brain. An examination of bin Laden's work,
however, reveals no significant impact by the Egyptian on
his thought or rhetoric. Indeed, such an assessment
clearly delineates how far bin Laden has drawn al-Zawahiri
away from his original positions and strategy. As with
Qutb, bin Laden does not quote al-Zawahiri in his own
statements, but stands with him as long as the Egyptian
sticks to the above-mentioned foundational documents of
Salafi-jihadism. It is worth noting that bin Laden appears
to have little use for self-taught Islamist scholars like the
English-major Qutb, the surgeon al-Zawahiri, or the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad's electrical-engineer-turned-Islamic
theorist, Muhammad al-Faraj. His respect is reserved for
those scholars who have received a traditional and formal
Salafist education via university educations or private
study with Salafi scholars, men such as Abdullah Azzam
and Safar al-Hawali. Ironically, bin Laden usually does
not even refer to the views of the Salafijihadi scholars he
most respects. There is no need to directly quote them.
By simply quoting the Qur-an and the Sunnah he is, in
essence, quoting those scholars but putting credit where it
belongs-in the hands of Allah and the Prophet
Muhammad.
Al Qaeda-ism is Takfirism: In bin Laden's works there is
nothing but a thorough and unequivocal denunciation of
Takfiri doctrine.7 He repeatedly and effectively attacks
those-especially Saudi-regime spokesmen-who identify
a form of worship and Islam's sixth pillar, what bin Laden calls "the peak of true
Islam." See Joas Wagemakers, A PuristJihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad
Al-Maqdisi, 36 BRIT.J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 281 (2009); Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy
of the Salafi Movement, 29 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 207 (2006), available at
http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WIKTOROWICZ_2006_Anatomy-of theSalafi_
Movement.pdf; Quintan Wiktorowicz & John Kaltner, Killing in the Name of Islam:
A l-Qaeda'sjustificationfor September 11, 10 MIDDLE E. POL'Y 76, 78 (2003).
7. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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him or al Qaeda as Takfiri. That said, bin Laden clearly
recognizes and respects the massively negative impact on
al Qaeda if the Saudis or others succeed in making the
Takfiri label stick. Bin Laden and his lieutenants seldom
deign to respond to criticism or accusations from Western
states or Arab tyrannies, but when accused of Takfirism,
he, al-Zawahiri, the late Abu Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Abu
Yaha al-Libi, and other senior al Qaeda lieutenants have
been quick to rebut the accusations. Bin Laden clearlyand accurately-foresees oblivion for al Qaeda and its
allies if the Muslim masses come to believe they are
Takfiris. His concern is evident in that he twice used
public statements to implicitly apologize to Muslims for
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Takfiri actions in Iraq, to assure
them they would not occur again, and to publicly and
explicitly urge al Qaeda to avoid Takfiri behavior. In late
2007, bin Laden apologized for al-Zarqawi's actions,
saying:
I assure Muslims in general and our people in the
neighboring states [to Iraq] in particular that they
will see nothing from the mujahedin [in Iraq] but all
that is good, God willing.

We are your sons.

The

Muslim victims who fall in operations against the
infidel Crusaders or their usurper [Iraqi] agents are
not the intended targets. God knows that we are
deeply saddened when some Muslims fall victim. Yet
we hold ourselves responsible and seek God's
forgiveness for that. We beseech God to have mercy
on them and let paradise be their final abode and to
compensate their families and relatives."
Al Qaeda Has No Central Command and Control: Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi's murderously Takfiri behavior in Iraq has
been the only potentially fatal strategic threat al Qaeda
has faced since 9/11. Indeed, if the U.S. military did not
kill him, al Qaeda would have found a way to dispose of
him, either by promoting him to a position where he
would not command fighters or by killing him. Indeed,
the relative ease with which U.S. interrogators claim to
8.
NEFA

Osama bin Laden, The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies (Dec. 27, 2007),
FOUND., http://wwwl.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefabinladen

1207.pdf.
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have elicited al-Zarqawi's location from a captured, close
associate is astounding and raises the possibility that al
Qaeda directed the man to allow himself to be captured
and then provide targeting data." Aside from the
substantial but temporary damage al-Zarqawi did to al
Qaeda's position in Iraq and to the group's Muslim-world
standing, bin Laden's handling of what can be called the
al-Zarqawi problem demonstrated his indirect managerial
style-avoiding public disputes with lieutenants and allies
is always his priority-and the continuing hierarchical
nature of al Qaeda. Bin Laden did not take on al-Zarqawi
in public, but assigned al-Zawahiri and another senior al
Qaeda figure-a North African named Atyiah-to bring
al-Zarqawi back on al Qaeda's non-Takfiri reservation. AlZawahiri did so in a measured but clearly pointed
manner. He stressed al Qaeda's respect for al-Zarqawi's
success in killing Americans and their allies, but told alZarqawi that he was part of a bigger whole that had an
international agenda that was being damaged by his
Takfiri actions, especially televised beheadings and the
bombing of mosques and shrines. When al-Zarqawi took
minimal remedial action, Atyiah followed with a much
harsher letter. It opens by saluting al-Zarqawi's lethal
accomplishments against U.S.-led forces but then harshly
chastises him for ignoring the fact that he is subordinate
to bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, demanding that
his actions complement not retard al Qaeda's
international goals, and pledging that he would be
removed from commanding al Qaeda in Iraq if he did not
quickly fall into line behind the directions of al Qaeda's
central leadership.
The content of both lettersespecially Atyiah's-as well as al Qaeda's ongoing rebound
in Iraq ought to give pause to the authors who have
identified al Qaeda as either a noncentralized
organization now isolated from its independent affiliates
or as a doctrinally takifiri organization. These authors are
largely mistaken and have skewed the now-losing U.S.
military's understanding of its Islamist foes, as well as the
doctrine it has shaped to defeat them. 9
9. For the supposedly simple (magical?) process of getting targeting data for
al-Zarqawi from a captured mujahid, see MATrHEw ALEXANDER & JOHN BRUNING,
HOW TO BREAK A TERRORIST: THE U.S. INTERROGATORS WHO USED BRAINS, NOT
BRUTALITY, TO TAKE DOWN THE DEADLIEST MAN IN IRAQ (2008).
10. The former Australian soldier David Kilcullen has published a book in
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Al Qaeda Has Failed: After reviewing bin Laden's words, it
is irrefutably clear that he always has intended al Qaeda's
primary role to be that of inciting and instigating Muslims
to jihad, not as a military machine meant to defeat Islam's
enemies by itself or in alliance with a few other groups.
Thus, the whole concept hawked by self-serving Western
politicians that they have made Western populations safer
because there has not been another 9/11 attack reflects
not only wishful thinking, but a singular ignorance of al
Qaeda's goals and the expanding power of its media
operations. At the time of 9/11, for example, al Qaeda's
main planning, training, and operational platform was in
Afghanistan. As 2011 begins, the group retains parts of
that platform and has added viable and growing bases in
Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and North Africa. In
addition, the example al Qaeda set by hurting the United
States and then not only surviving but growing in numbers
and expanding geographically has been an inspiration for
continued or increased organizational activity and
violence by Islamist fighters in the North Caucasus,
southern Thailand, Europe, across the Far East, Kashmir,
the Arabian Peninsula, India, Nigeria and other places in
west and east Africa, and the United States. In short, al
Qaeda not only retains substantial military capabilities for
a group of its limited size, but it has a developed an
outsized media and geographical reach. In terms of
inspiration and instigation capabilities, al Qaeda is today
exactly what bin Laden intended it to be: an unqualified
success in inspiring Muslims to wage jihad across the
Islamic world. Today, al Qaeda probably is about where
bin Laden expected it to be, given his clear expectation of
a multigenerational struggle and his frequent frustrated
and chiding remarks to the many Muslims males still to
join the jihad.

which he describes as Takfiris virtually all of the Afghan and non-Afghan
mujahedin fighting the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.
The book has
repeatedly been cited in the media as the basis for current U.S. military strategy in
Afghanistan. This is too bad. A realistic analysis of the mujahedin fighting in
Afghanistan would find almost no Takfiris among them. It also would find that
those that are in Afghanistan are being hunted down and killed by the other
mujahedin.

See DAVID KILCULLEN, THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA: FIGHTING SMALL

WARS IN THE MIDST OF A BIG ONE (2009).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/27

10

Scheuer: Not Reading Means Losing: The National Security Cost of Ignoring

5330

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:5

Polling Shows al Qaeda is Irrelevant Not surprisingly, many
non-Muslim authors place high value on the results of
polling by reputable Western pollsters in the Muslim
world, and some of it is indeed very valuable. But the
or
personality-based
celebrity-measuring
polls'
questions-such as "Do you approve of Osama bin
Laden?" or "Would you want to live under a bin Laden
They disguise
government?"-are virtually worthless.
reality and give hope where there should be little or none.
Today's low positive responses to such questions would
skyrocket tomorrow if al Qaeda attacks successfully in the
United States or Israel. The key polling questions are the
ones that mesh with what bin Laden identifies as the
motivation for jihad and with what he wants to achieve.
Questions such as, "What do you think of U.S. foreign
policy?"; "Do you want to be governed with a large
measure of Sharia law?"; and "Do you believe your current
government is un-Islamic, has failed, and/or is
oppressive?" elicit the most informing responses. Polling
shows virtual unanimous hatred among Muslims for U.S.
foreign policy and current Muslim governments, and a
large majority favoring a substantial measure of Sharia law
in governance. These results, moreover, are nearly the
same among key cohorts: young and old, male and
female, and militant and moderate." As long as these
results remain consistently high for protracted periods in
these cohorts-as they have for a decade-bin Laden is on
the right track for his purposes. Indeed, his refusal to use
public words to build his own celebrity, and his use of
them instead to focus unrelentingly on al Qaeda's three
war aims-driving the United States from the Muslim
world, destroying Israel and Arab tyrannies, and returning
to the "true" Islam-and on inciting Muslims to join the
jihad to attain these aims, is nothing short of genius.
As noted above, none of this means that Osama bin Laden, al
Qaeda, and their Islamist allies are ten-foot tall enemies; indeed,
with any kind of manly Western response, both could have been
eliminated at almost anytime between bin Laden's 1996 declaration
of war and mid-1999. That, of course, did not happen, mostly
because of the inferior and timid quality of Western political and
11.
See JOHN L. ESPOSITO & DALiA MOGAHED, WHO SPEAKS FOR ISLAM? WHAT A
BILLION MUSLIMS REALLY THINK (2008).
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military leadership. What a reading of the primary bin Laden
documents does suggest, however, is that fifteen years into the war
bin Laden has waged, the West's understanding of its Islamist
enemies' former leader and his goals is at best marginal because of
its political leaders' failure to read what he has said, accept that his
motivation is what he says it is, and recognize that he intends to do
what he has said he will do. This reality is troubling as there is no
doubt that the U.S., British, and other Western intelligence services
have provided their elected and civil-servant superiors with detailed
analyses of bin Laden's words ever since he declared war in 1996,
and that these analyses surely contradict the popular they-hate-usfor-our-freedom mantra often stated by political leaders.
Thinking back nearly ninety years, the West last made this kind
of deliberate error when it failed to read but readily scorned and
ridiculed the published words of a jailed, former corporal in the
Kaiser's army. Now, as then, it would be wise to take the guidance
of another man who intended and came closest to destroying the
United States. "The better rule," Robert E. Lee said, "is to judge
,,12
our adversaries from their standpoint, not from our own.

12. PETER G. TsouRAs,
COMMANDERS 90 (1998).
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PART IV: STUDENT NOTE
The following article was prepared by a student at William
Mitchell College of Law.
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